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ABSTRACT
The paper analyzes the transmission mechanisms of ﬁscal shocks in a two-country general equi-
librium model with sticky prices in line with the new open economy macroeconomics (NOEM)
approach. Speciﬁcally, the model allows for both market segmentation and asymmetric pref-
erences. We introduce money via a cash-in-advance constraint: Households need cash in order
to purchase consumption goods and to pay taxes. Therefore, government expenditures are
relevant for overall money demand. Providing closed form solutions, we ﬁnd that a balanced
budget ﬁscal expansion results in an appreciation of the exchange rate. This result stands
in sharp contrast to standard open economy models with money-in-the-utility (MIU), that
predict depreciations. The exchange rate movement is all the more pronounced, the higher
the degree of pricing-to-market and the stronger the bias for domestically produced goods.
As an appreciation of the short run exchange rate implies lower competitiveness of domestic
ﬁrms, production is temporarily shortened. Therefore, the deterioration of the trade balance
is exacerbated when compared with MIU models. We show that the terms of trade depend
qualitatively and quantitatively on the degree of pricing-to-market, whereas a home bias in
consumption only rules its amplitude. A rigorous welfare analysis reveals that a ﬁscal ex-
pansion is a “prosper-thy-neighbor” instrument. A higher share of PTM goods reinforces the
prosper-thy-neighbor eﬀect while a home bias in consumption tends to reduce the positive
spillover eﬀects.
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What are the welfare implications of monetary and ﬁscal policy in a globalized world? Since
Mundell (1963) and Fleming (1962) economists try to address the issue by formal models.
While well established not only in the scientiﬁc arena but also in practice, Keynesian-type of
international macro-models have a severe draw back: the entire absence of microfoundations
results in the use of ad hoc welfare criteria. Eventually, Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (1995a) intro-
duced the now famous Redux model into the literature on open macroeconomics. The model
incorporates explicit microfoundations and thereby improves the welfare analysis of monetary
and ﬁscal shocks substantially.
One of the most prominent topics in international ﬁnance is the potential role of ﬁscal
shocks for exchange rate movements, international price level diﬀerentials and welfare eﬀects.
However, the vast majority of the literature on new open economy macroeconomics (NOEM)
emanating from the Redux model has concentrated on the transmission mechanisms of mone-
tary shocks, as pointed out by Ganelli and Lane (2002). There are a few notable exceptions,
though. Ganelli (2003) analyzes useful government spending in the Redux framework while
Tille (2001) focuses on the role of consumption substitutability in the international trans-
mission of ﬁscal shocks. Corsetti and Pesenti (2001) stress the potential beggar-thy-neighbor
property of ﬁscal expansions when national government purchases fall exclusively on domesti-
cally produced goods.
Following this line of research, we analyze ﬁscal policy in a two-country general equilibrium
model with sticky prices. Speciﬁcally, we focus on the competing welfare eﬀects of pricing-to-
market (PTM) and a home bias in consumption in a cash-in-advance economy where govern-
ment expenditures trigger additional money demand. Tracing back to Mankiw and Summers
(1986), empirical research suggests that government purchases are relevant for money demand.
Our model captures this eﬀect as households need cash in order to purchase consumption goods
and to pay taxes such that money demand is absorption rather than consumption based. As
a consequence, expansive ﬁscal policy leads to an appreciation of the exchange rate, which
stands in sharp contrast to the standard money-in-the-utility (MIU) approach. As both the
reaction of the terms-of-trade and the expenditure switching eﬀect depend on the exchange
rate movement, the implications of PTM and a home bias in consumption are very diﬀerent
from those in a MIU setting. We demonstrate that a higher share of PTM goods reinforces
1prosper-thy-neighbor eﬀects of ﬁscal expansions while a home bias in consumption tends to
reduce positive spillovers.
The role of pricing-to-market in international economics has been intensively studied in the
last years. Seminal papers on pricing-to-market are Krugman (1987), and Dornbusch (1987)
while empirical support for PTM is provided by Knetter (1993). In the context of NOEM with
money-in-the-utility, Betts and Devereux (2000) provide an innovative study of pricing-to-
market behavior and its implications for the international transmission of asymmetric shocks.
However, they neither consider a home bias in consumption nor do they analyze the welfare
eﬀects of ﬁscal policy explicitly. As for biased preferences, recent empirical studies by Mc-
Callum (1995), Helliwell (1996), and Wei (1996), that investigate so called border eﬀects in
international trade, conﬁrm that there is a persisting home bias in consumption despite the
opening up of the industrial countries. Warnock (1999) oﬀers an analysis of ﬁscal policy in a
MIU model against the backdrop of idiosyncratic tastes but leaves out the possibility of PTM
and does not provide a detailed welfare analysis. Pitterle and Steﬀen (2004) investigate the
eﬀects of a home bias in consumption in a monetary union setting. The paper shows that the
absence of the exchange rate channel leads to an increased importance of demand composition
eﬀects for the international transmission of ﬁscal policy.
The underlying model of our analysis is perhaps closest to Carr´ e and Collard (2003) who
analyze ﬁscal and technology shocks in cash-in-advance economy under alternative exchange
rate regimes. However, our approach diﬀers methodologically, since we provide closed form
solutions. We achieve this as we leave out capital accumulation and consider exogenous price
rigidities.1 The analytical solution identiﬁes the main mechanisms at work and provides a
deeper understanding of ﬁscal policy interdependencies.
We ﬁnd that a domestic balanced budget ﬁscal expansion results in an appreciation of
the equilibrium exchange rate. The very reason for this lies in the feature that increased
government expenditures raise overall domestic money demand because taxes have to be paid
with cash and private consumption is only partially crowded out. As we do not consider an
accommodating monetary policy and prices of domestically produced goods are ﬁxed in the
short run, the required increase of real balances can only be brought about through cheaper
imports. This in turn implies that the exchange rate has to appreciate. As an appreciation of
1The inclusion of capital accumulation and endogenous price rigidities impedes that the model economy reach
a new steady state quickly after unanticipated shocks. Therefore, an analytical solution cannot be derived.
2the short run exchange rate implies lower competitiveness of domestic ﬁrms, home production is
shortened. Therefore, our results caution about possible output stimulating eﬀects of expansive
ﬁscal policy in the short run. Furthermore, the exchange rate movement rather exacerbates
the deterioration of the trade balance while MIU models predict a mitigating eﬀect.
The exchange rate response is all the more pronounced, the higher the degree of pricing-to-
market and the stronger the bias for domestically produced goods. We show that the short run
response of the terms of trade depends qualitatively and quantitatively on the degree of pricing-
to-market, whereas a home bias in consumption only rules its amplitude. The incorporation
of biased preferences implies that purchasing power parity does not hold even in the long run.
This captures the empirical evidence of persistent price level deviations of countries that face
similar monetary policy. A prominent example for this phenomenon is the regional inﬂation
experience of the European Monetary Union (EMU).
The incorporation of an explicit optimization problem of the households allows us to con-
duct a rigorous welfare analysis. Aggregating short and long run welfare for the foreign house-
holds reveals that a domestic ﬁscal expansion acts as a“prosper-thy-neighbor”instrument. We
identify three major transmission mechanisms: the expansion of world demand, the change
of the terms of trade and expenditure switching. A detailed analysis of the competing eﬀects
demonstrates that a higher share of PTM goods reinforces the prosper-thy-neighbor eﬀect.
Even though the positive welfare eﬀects from expenditure switching decrease with more pro-
ducers pursuing pricing-to-market, the simultaneous improvement of the terms of trade dom-
inates. In contrast, a home bias in consumption tends to reduce the positive spillover eﬀects
because of the lower relevance of international trade for both economies.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a description of the model. Section 3
provides long run and short run solutions of the linearized system, while section 4 explores the
welfare implications of ﬁscal shocks. Section 5 concludes.
2 MODEL SETUP
The considered model consists of two countries, home and foreign, of equal size. This feature
is mandatory because households display a home bias in consumption. Diﬀerent population
sizes lead to a structure of world demand such that an analytical solution for the steady
state is precluded. We normalize the population size in each country to one. Producers in
3both countries are split into two groups. A fraction s of producers are capable of segmenting
markets as arbitrage for these goods is ruled out. They set prices for home and foreign markets
in the respective buyer’s currency, i.e. they pursue local currency pricing. Following Betts and
Devereux (2000), we call that kind of pricing behavior“pricing-to-market”(PTM). To be more
precise, the pricing behavior we label PTM comprises segmenting markets and local currency
pricing. The remaining (1 ¡ s) producers price goods in the currency of the seller. There is
no restriction on trade in these goods. Hence, markets cannot be segmented, and only one
price may be set by the producers. This behavior - “producer-currency-pricing” (PCP) from
now on - is consistent with the law of one price that shows up in more traditional models of
international macroeconomics.
2.1 Households
The description of the model will be carried out in detail for the home country. As for the
foreign country, most of the equations are deﬁned analogously, while all foreign variables are
denoted with an asterisk.
Households derive utility from consumption and leisure. As we are interested in obtaining
a manageable closed form solution of the model, we use a special case of the general isoelastic
utility function: The elasticity of intertemporal substitution is set to one and equal weight is






log ct + log(1 ¡ ht)
¢
; (1)
where ¯ 2 [0;1] denotes the discount factor, (1¡ht) represents leisure enjoyed by the household,
and ct is a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) real consumption index. The latter consists
of a basket of goods produced in the domestic economy, ch
t , and a basket of goods produced in




















By determining the weight of the domestically produced goods in the consumption index,
4! 2 [0:5;1) serves as a measure of a possible home bias in consumption.2 If ! > 0:5, home
and foreign households have biased demand for goods that are produced in their own country,
whereas the fraction of imported goods in the consumption bundle is smaller than 0:5. The
parameter µ > 1 denotes the elasticity of substitution between the two consumption baskets





































t aggregates over the consumption of individual PTM goods cm
t (h) and PCP goods ca
t(h)
that are produced in the domestic economy. c
f
t aggregates over the consumption of individual
PTM goods cm
t (h) and PCP goods ca
t(h) that are produced in the foreign economy. To keep
the preference structure simple, we follow Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (1995a) and assume the same
cross-country and within-country substitutability of goods.3
































(1 ¡ !)ct (6)
The demand functions are speciﬁed for goods produced at home (h) and abroad (f). A further
distinction has to be made for goods of PCP producers, indicated by a, and goods oﬀered
by PTM producers, indicated by m. The diﬀerence between pricing-to-market and producer-
currency-pricing shows up most clearly in the demand functions (5) and (6) for foreign goods.
While foreign PCP producers set a foreign currency price that has to be multiplied by the
2Warnock (2003) models a home bias in consumption using a similar speciﬁcation of consumption preferences.
3Tille (2001) investigates the eﬀects of diﬀering substitutabilities on the welfare implications of ﬁscal and
monetary shocks.
5exchange rate, et, to yield domestic currency prices,4 foreign PTM producers segment markets
and set the price directly in the currency of the domestic consumer. Hence, in times of ﬁxed
prices and exchange rate movements it is only the prices of PCP goods that may change.
The possibility of pricing-to-market thereby tends to limit the exchange rate pass-through
into import prices. A home bias in consumption implies that, for any given relative price,
households always demand relatively more domestic goods than foreigners do.







































Again, the aggregate price level (7) is a home biased function of import prices (f), and prices
of domestic goods (h). The price index for domestic goods (8) and the import price index (9)
aggregate over the prices of (1 ¡ s) individual PCP goods, and over a fraction of s goods that
are priced to market.
The household’s optimization problem is constrained by
mt + Rtft+1 · ft + ptwtht + Πt (10)
mt ¸ pt(ct + Tt) (11)
The budget constraint (10) says that nominal expenditure on cash holdings and bond purchases
cannot exceed income derived from remuneration of labor eﬀort, proﬁts and maturing bonds.
In order to smooth consumption, households may purchase nominal one-period bonds ft+1,
that are denominated in domestic currency units. The bond price Rt is inversely related to
4We use price notation as it is standard.
6the nominal interest rate. Our timing convention is the following: Bonds denoted with t + 1
are acquired at the beginning of period t and mature at the beginning of period t + 1. The
speciﬁcation of the budget constraint is a short cut to Helpman (1981) as money holdings are
not carried over from the previous period, though it is theoretically possible to do so. As
Helpman points out, households will not ﬁnd it reasonable to hold money over periods in the
presence of interest yielding bonds. Money thereby reduces to ”money to spend”. Another
important aspect of the budget constraint is the timing of payments. Households receive
nominal labor income, ptwtht, and proﬁts, Πt, instantaneously. As a result, neither ﬁrms nor
households hold money longer than an instant. We thereby avoid an additional source of
distortion that would blur our analysis of nominal rigidities.5
Additionally, households face a cash-in-advance constraint (11) ` a la Helpman (1981) and
Lucas (1982). Households need money in order to carry out consumption goods purchases and
tax payments. Our speciﬁcation avoids possible distortions of the consumption decision by
unexpected inﬂation as households decide on money demand after the occurrence of shocks.
In the light of positive nominal interest rates the constraint is binding. In contrast to the
NOEM literature, we are quite aware of the fact that the speciﬁcation of money demand alters
the outcome of our analysis substantially.6 The eﬀect of ﬁscal shocks on the exchange rate, for
example, will be radically diﬀerent in a standard model with money in the utility or models
with CIA constraints where taxes do not have to be paid with cash. The very reason for this
lies in the feature that, in our model, money demand depends not only on the consumption
level, but on total absorption. Thus, tax-ﬁnanced government expenditure increases ceteris
paribus demand for money in equilibrium.
Households maximize their intertemporal utility (1) subject to (10) and (11). The decision
variables at time t are ft+1, ht, and ct. Optimal bond holdings yield standard Euler equations
of the form
¯ pt ct = Rt pt+1 ct+1 (12)
That is, marginal utility of consumption today equals marginal utility of future consumption,




5Thanks to Fabrice Collard who gave us some clarifying remarks on that subject.
6See for a detailed discussion Chang and Lai (1997).
7Note that due to our deﬁnition of bonds, real interest rates may diﬀer internationally. As
opposed to Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (1995a), real bond payoﬀs depend on possible inﬂation, and
in the case of the foreign country also on exchange rate movements. The optimal labor supply







At the margin, an additional unit of leisure yields the same utility as the extra consumption
possibilities derived from an additional unit of work that is remunerated with the current real
wage.
The cash-in-advance constraint (11) may be interpreted as the money demand function
md
t = pt(ct + Tt)
Note that this implies a consumption elasticity of money demand equal to one in the absence
of taxes.
2.2 Government
The government decides in every period on purchases of public goods gt. Let the public
consumption indexes be deﬁned analogously to the real consumption indices of the households.7
Government spending is assumed to be purely dissipative, i.e. the public good does not enter
the household’s utility function at all.8 The government ﬁnances its expenditures via lump
sum taxes Tt. The government budget constraint therefore reduces to
gt = Tt
7Some authors, e.g. Tille (2001) consider a complete home bias in government expenditure. However, under
this speciﬁcation, the demand stimulating eﬀects of ﬁscal policy only fall on the home country and the foreign
country is likely to be worse oﬀ.
8Ganelli (2003) investigates the implications of welfare enhancing government spending under the assumption
of non-separability. Take Beetsma and Jensen (2002) for the general preference case. In their model, the utility
of public spending is additively separable from private consumption. This is also true for Corsetti and Pesenti
(2001).




t¡1 = ¯ ms
2.3 Firms
Suppose that production is linear in the only production factor labor. We abstract from
technology shocks and thus deﬁne the production functions for PTM producers h 2 [0;s] and
PCP producers h 2 [s;1] in its simplest form:
ya
t (h) = ha
t(h)
ym
t (h) + ym¤
t (h) = hm
t (h)



























In the PTM case, producers maximize a proﬁt function that distinguishes explicitly between
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9The optimization problem of the producers is essentially static because we assume exogenous price rigidities.
Models that endogenize price rigidities via explicit price adjustment costs like Hairault and Portier (1993) or
use Calvo (1983) style price determination as in Kollmann (2001a, 2001b) yield more dynamic optimization













Though PTM producers are free to pursue price discrimination they will set the same domestic
currency price for home and foreign consumers. To see this, we derive the optimal price setting
rule of any home producer h by solving the respective maximization problems. It turns out






Note that a higher µ implies a lower mark up. That is, the degree of monopolistic distortion
decreases with the degree of substitutability of goods. As a result of the assumed constant
elasticity of substitution (CES) consumption baskets the level of overall demand does not
inﬂuence the optimal price. Therefore, PTM producers will not charge diﬀerent prices across
countries, even if the demand levels diﬀered. Furthermore, both types of producers face the
same marginal production costs, and will therefore set the same price. However, if prices are
rigid PCP and PTM consumer prices diﬀer when the exchange rate changes.
In order to analyze the distribution of gains in international trade it is convenient to deﬁne
the terms of trade which describe the relation between domestic export and import price








where the domestic import price index p
f
t is given by equation (9). The domestic export price

















103 POSITIVE ANALYSIS OF FISCAL SHOCKS
3.1 Steady state
To get a ﬁrst feel for the characteristics of the model it is useful to start with the calculation
of a steady state. To achieve a closed form solution we choose the most simple form of the
steady state, where initial bond holdings and government expenditure equal zero. At the
same time, the steady state exercise yields the ﬂexible price version of the model which serves
as a starting point for the following shock analysis in the presence of price rigidities. From
a technical perspective, we need the steady state of the model as we evaluate the dynamic
system around a stationary equilibrium. In fact, the propagation of shocks will be analyzed
only locally. In the sequel, steady state values of the variables are barred.
One of the most important features of Redux style models is the incorporation of mono-
polistic competition. This facilitates demand driven welfare improvements in the short run,
because production is ineﬃciently low in the initial steady state. We may derive the output
level from the steady state labor markets:





whereas the socially optimal employment (production) level would be 1
2. The inverse markup
µ¡1
µ , that deﬁnes the market power of ﬁrms, enters the labor market equilibrium through the
(distorted) real wage that workers receive for an hour worked, see pricing equation (14). Steady







¯ h = ¯ h
Obviously, an ineﬃciently low level of hours worked translates into ineﬃciently low production
and thereby lower consumption. Barred versions of the Euler equation (12) link the steady




Finally, money market clearing reveals that the steady state exchange rate hinges on relative






Intuitively, a loose relative monetary policy precipitates a depreciation of the exchange rate
while a higher relative consumption level yields an appreciation.
3.2 Long run equilibrium
We now turn to the policy experiment of an unanticipated asymmetric ﬁscal shock. What will
happen to the key variables if the government raises its tax-ﬁnanced expenditures? For welfare
analysis purposes it is crucial to determine the dynamic response of consumption and hours
worked because both enter the utility function of the representative agent. The movement of
the exchange rate is at the center of our analysis as it determines consumption, hours worked,
and the terms of trade. The latter are in turn decisive for the distribution of gains in trade
and therefore have strong implications for the welfare eﬀects of ﬁscal shocks.
Though our set of equations is complex, it is possible to solve for the individual variables,
because the dynamic system reaches its new steady state right after the shock period. This
feature is due to the special form of price rigidities - prices have to be set before the occurrence
of shocks but may be changed in the following period - and some more subtle issues such
as the lack of capital accumulation. Given this special structure, we may split the algebraic
problem into two parts that can be treated (almost) independently. First, we solve for the long
run (post shock, ﬂexible price) values of the international consumption diﬀerential and the
exchange rate. It turns out that these depend on exogenous variables and endogenous bond
holdings that are determined in the short run (post shock, rigid prices). Second, we solve for
the short run equilibrium given the long run values of the variables. The combination of the
short run (period t) and long run (period t+1) solution ﬁnally yields the solution for exchange
rates, consumption levels, hours worked, price levels and so forth. The essential link between
the short and long run system will be the bond holdings acquired in the shock period.10 The
following system of equations includes the market clearing and optimality conditions that de-
ﬁne the long run equilibrium.
10The importance of the current account as a main channel of international transmission of shocks is stressed























pt+1(ct+1 + gt+1) + Rt+1ft+2 = ph



















































(1 ¡ !)(ct+1 + gt+1) (21)
Euler equations
































Equations (16) and (17) assure that money markets in both countries clear. The national
13Table 1: Linearized long run price indexes
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budget constraints are described by (18) and (19): Nominal expenditures on private and gov-
ernment consumption and on home-currency denominated bonds must equal nominal income
from goods sales plus pay-oﬀs derived from maturing bonds acquired in the previous period.
(20) and (21) represent the goods market clearing conditions. As prices are ﬂexible in the long
run and all producers face the same marginal production costs, we do not have to distinguish
between PCP and PTM goods markets. Equations (22) and (23) are the Euler equations,
describing the optimal path of consumption growth in both countries. Finally, (24) and (25)
represent the labor markets, which combine the households’ optimal labor supply decision and
the ﬁrms’ pricing rule, i.e. the optimal price as a markup over wages.
Since the model we consider is non-linear we have to recur to a method of linearization
before proceeding. As it is standard in the NOEM literature we log-linearize the model around
the steady state.11 From now on, let the percentage deviation12 of a variable x from its steady
state value ¯ x be deﬁned as ˜ x = dx
¯ x . As we assume zero bond holdings and no government
expenditure in the initial steady state, the respective deviation of these variables will be related
to steady state domestic consumption ¯ c.
An important feature of our model are the long run implications of ﬁscal shocks for the
price levels. Due to the home bias in private and public consumption, changes in the marginal
production cost diﬀerential are reﬂected in a deviation from purchasing power parity. To derive
this eﬀect, consider the linearized versions of the domestic price indices (7), (8), (9), and its
foreign counterparts, that are stated in Table 1.
11This implies that we may not consider shocks to the system that are ”too big” as the approximation error
would grow too much once you leave the steady state. See Corsetti and Pesenti (2001) for a NOEM model that
does not rely on log-linearization. However, the applied Cobb-Douglas speciﬁcation of the consumption baskets
rules out current account imbalances.
12For the sake of lean exposition, we will always refer to the deviation of a variable, if not otherwise stated.
14In the long run, producers are free to set their prices and PTM producers may still segment
markets. Anyhow, the law of one price will hold for all types of goods, because the optimal
price across producers is derived as a markup on marginal production costs. Therefore, PTM
producers will set prices for foreign markets in the same way as PCP producers do. That is,
they calculate the optimal price in the producer’s currency and then multiply (divide) it by
the exchange rate. The law of one price, though, does not imply purchasing power parity, as
marginal production costs across countries may diﬀer. For example, if the real wage at home
is higher than abroad, domestic producers - PTM and PCP types alike - will set a higher price
than their foreign competitors. Then, it is not only the exchange rate, but also the mix of
domestic and foreign goods in the consumption bundles that governs the international price
level diﬀerential:
˜ pt+1 ¡ ˜ p¤
t+1 = ˜ et+1 + (2! ¡ 1)(˜ ph
t+1 ¡ ˜ p
f
t+1) (26)
Obviously, in a world of symmetric preferences, i.e. ! = 0:5, equation (26) reduces to the
familiar log-linear form of purchasing power parity, ˜ pt+1 ¡ ˜ p¤
t+1 = ˜ et+1.
Following Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (1995a) and Aoki (1981) we now solve for the diﬀerences of
the linearized variables and then calculate the individual variables. Combining the diﬀerence
of the linearized long run money markets, (16) and (17), and remembering that both central
banks leave the money supply unchanged, we can derive the following expression for the long
run exchange rate:
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Equation (27) reveals that the endogenous price diﬀerential of home and foreign goods only
enters the exchange rate equation if there is a home bias in consumption. As already mentioned,
the reason for this lies in the lack of purchasing power parity in the long run. Once we set
! to 0:5 we arrive immediately at an exchange rate equation that only depends on exogenous
variables and the long run consumption diﬀerential.
Using linearized versions of equations (18)-(25) we may derive the long run consumption
15diﬀerential following some deviations from the steady state in the short run:13
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The evolution of the long run consumption diﬀerential is governed by nominal bond holdings
ft+1 and long run government expenditure gt+1. The sign of domestic bond holdings will be
determined by the short run solution of the model. Assume domestic households acquire debt in
the short run responding to a domestic ﬁscal expansion. Negative domestic bond holdings then
reduce the consumption diﬀerential as home residents face permanent interest payments that
allow for a higher relative consumption of foreign residents. A positive long run government
spending diﬀerential yields a further reduction of the consumption diﬀerential.14 This is due to
the permanent reduction of disposable income in the home country as government expenditures
are tax-ﬁnanced. Once we abstract from home bias concerns, the coeﬃcient that determines
the impact of government spending on consumption reduces to ¡ µ
µ+(µ¡1), which is always less
than one. This illustrates the model feature of limited crowding out of private consumption,
i.e. domestic households reduce their consumption by less than the increased tax burden.15
Thus, a domestic ﬁscal expansion stimulates overall domestic demand.
Finally, we may take a look at the eﬀects of a home bias in private consumption and
government spending on the long run consumption diﬀerential. While the coeﬃcient of bond
holdings remains unaﬀected, the coeﬃcient of the public spending diﬀerential depends on
the size of !. With
dgt+1¡dg¤
t+1
¯ c > 0, the partial derivative of the consumption diﬀerential
with respect to ! is positive,
@(˜ ct+1¡˜ c¤
t+1)
@! > 0. Therefore, a rising home bias mitigates the
negative eﬀect of an asymmetric domestic ﬁscal expansion on the consumption diﬀerential.
The explanation for this kind of smoothing is straightforward, once you consider the goods
markets. Domestic demand increases relatively to foreign demand because of the limited
crowding out eﬀect of the ﬁscal expansion. As both, public and private demand, are ruled
by a home bias, the overall increase in world demand falls primarily on home goods, thereby
increasing domestic relative income compared with a situation of symmetric preferences.
13See Appendix A for details.








15This behavior is reinforced by the way we model government consumption as private utility remains unaf-
fected.
163.3 Short run equilibrium
We can now proceed to the analysis of the short run (period t) equilibrium, which is charac-
terized by sticky prices. Producers ﬁx their prices before the occurrence of the ﬁscal shock
and cannot change them but in the next period. Consequently, production becomes entirely
demand determined. This in turn implies that we do not have to consider labor markets in
the short run equilibrium system, which can be described by the following equations:
Money markets
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The short run equilibrium system diﬀers in two main aspects from the long run equilibrium.
First, there are separated goods market clearing conditions for PCP and PTM goods. In
case of the latter, a further distinction has to be made between demand that stems from the
respective domestic markets and demand faced in the foreign markets. Second, as usual in this
type of model, the labor market clearing condition is not binding because, as explained above,
ﬁrms adjust production somehow passively to the demand consistent with the previously ﬁxed
prices. The linearized version of the short run equilibrium is stated in Appendix B.
We are now ready to derive the short run exchange rate response. Using short term versions
of the linearized price indexes stated in Table 1 and remembering that prices are sticky in the
short run, it becomes clear that a change in the overall price index can only be brought about
through a variation of the exchange rate:
˜ pt = (1 ¡ !)(1 ¡ s)˜ et (33)
˜ p¤
t = ¡(1 ¡ !)(1 ¡ s)˜ et: (34)
Obviously, the overall price indexes do not respond to an exchange rate movement if there is
either full pricing to market (s = 1) or a very strong home bias (! ! 1). Taking linearized
diﬀerences of the money market equations (29) and (30), substituting for the price levels and
keeping in mind that money supplies do not vary, we get the following expression for the
exchange rate:
˜ et =





2(1 ¡ !)(1 ¡ s)
(35)
Thus, the movement of the exchange rate depends on the interaction of the government ex-
penditure diﬀerential and the endogenous private consumption diﬀerential.
In a next step, we solve for the linearized diﬀerence between the home and foreign budget
18constraints (31) and (32). Substituting for the resulting diﬀerences between goods demands
and for the diﬀerence between the overall price levels, we obtain the following expression for
the exchange rate:
˜ et =
(˜ ct ¡ ˜ c¤
t) +
¯dft+1




2s ¡ 1 + 2!µ(1 ¡ s)
(36)
These two exchange rate equations contain two endogenous terms, ˜ ct ¡ ˜ c¤
t and dft+1, and the
exogenous government expenditure diﬀerential dgt¡dg¤
t. In the following, we have to eliminate
the short run consumption diﬀerential and the international bond holdings from the exchange
rate equations. For this purpose, we ﬁrst solve the long run consumption diﬀerential (28) for
dft+1
¯ p¯ c . Next, we use linearized versions of the Euler equations in order to eliminate the long run
consumption diﬀerential. Then, substituting for the international bond holdings in (36) and
combining it with exchange rate equation (35) so as to eliminate the short run consumption
diﬀerential, gives us the short run response of the exchange rate to an unanticipated ﬁscal
shock.16
As we are mainly interested in the impact of a permanent shock, we assume here that
dgt+1 = dgt = dgp:17
˜ et = ¡
µ(µ ¡ 1)2!
(µ ¡ 1)2! + 1
r
¡
(µ ¡ 1)(1 ¡ s)2! + 1
¢¡
2! ¡ 1 + 2(1 ¡ !)µ
¢





From now on, we consider an asymmetric domestic ﬁscal expansion where dgp > 0 and dg¤
p = 0.
For the parameter range given above, an unanticipated permanent positive shock to home
government expenditure will lead to a nominal appreciation of the exchange rate. The driving
force behind this result is an increase in the relative domestic demand for real balances.
Consider the following adjustment process: A higher level of government expenditure is
ﬁnanced by an increase in taxes. Therefore, the disposable income of domestic households
decreases, which forces them to reduce consumption, leading to a higher marginal utility of
consumption. In the short run, output and consequently hours worked are completely demand
determined. In the long run, however, home residents are inclined to work more so as to achieve
16Appendix B provides a detailed description of the solution process.
17Following a temporary ﬁscal shock, the exchange rate appreciation would be more pronounced because the
long run government spending diﬀerential enters the short run exchange rate equation with a positive sign.
19the optimal labor leisure trade oﬀ. The marginal utility of leisure rises while the additional
income spent on consumption lowers the marginal utility of consumption until equilibrium is
restored. In that case, the long run labor market will clear at a higher equilibrium work eﬀort
facilitating a re-increase of consumption. Via the Euler equations that describe the households’
desire for consumption smoothing - abstracting from real interest rate eﬀects - a higher long
run consumption level implies higher short run consumption. Then, due to the cash in advance
constraint18 domestic households are in the conjectured need of extra real balances in order to
ﬁnance the re-increase of consumption. As both money supply and domestic prices are ﬁxed in
the short run, an increase of real balances can only be brought about through cheaper imports.
This requires an appreciation of the exchange rate.
We can now proceed to analyze how the degree of PTM and the home bias aﬀect the
response of the nominal exchange rate in the light of a domestic ﬁscal expansion. In the case of
PTM, it is easy to see via the partial derivative, @et
@s , that a higher value of s leads to a larger
appreciation. A higher share of PTM goods implies that less goods are aﬀected by a variation
of the exchange rate. Consequently, the prices of the goods not subject to PTM have to change
more strongly to restore equilibrium, which means that the appreciation of the exchange rate
has to be more pronounced.
Likewise, a higher value of !, representing a stronger bias for domestically produced goods,
should reinforce the appreciation of the exchange rate. Again, the explanation is straightfor-
ward: A smaller proportion of imported goods in the consumption basket of the household
implies that the prices of these goods have to change more strongly to obtain the required
change of the overall price level. Yet, the sign of the partial derivative of the exchange rate
with respect to ! is not unique. However, for reasonable parameter values our reasoning is
validated. Figure 1 illustrates the eﬀect of a variation in ! on the exchange rate for diﬀerent
values of s when domestic government expenditure
dgp
¯ c is increased by one percent. For the
numerical simulation we picked standard parameter values, namely µ = 6 and ¯ = 0:95.19 The
value of µ yields a relatively high mark up rate suitable for countries that are less competitive
than the United States, see Hairault and Portier (1993).
We are now prepared to solve the model for the consumption and output responses. Starting
18Remember that government expenditures leave domestic money demand unchanged if there is full crowding
out of private consumption.











0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
omega
Figure 1: Eﬀect of ! 2 [0:5;1) on the short run exchange rate.
with the short run world consumption response, we add up linearized versions of the short run







Note that price deviations cancel out by (33) and (34). The eﬀect of ﬁscal expansions on overall
world consumption is unambiguously negative and it does not matter whether the expansion
is temporary or permanent.20 This is due to the fact that overall world demand has to remain
unchanged as world real money balances are ﬁxed in the short run. The level of any individual
variable may be stated as a combination of its world aggregate and its diﬀerential:
















¡ (1 ¡ !)(1 ¡ s)˜ et (38)
where the consumption diﬀerential is deduced from exchange rate equation (35), that stems
20In Betts and Devereux (2000) the short run world consumption level is aﬀected if and only if ﬁscal expansions
are permanent.
21from money market clearing. We see that the eﬀect of a government spending shock on short
run consumption at home can be decomposed into two parts. As mentioned before, the direct
eﬀect of an increase in tax ﬁnanced government spending is - ceteris paribus - a complete
crowding out of private consumption. At the same time, however, there is an indirect price
eﬀect through the response of the exchange rate. An appreciation lowers the home price level,
which allows - through the money market conditions - consumption to fall by less than the
amount of taxes paid. In the same way, we derive the foreign consumption response:
˜ c¤












+ (1 ¡ !)(1 ¡ s)˜ et
= (1 ¡ !)(1 ¡ s)˜ et
The only eﬀect on foreign’s short run consumption stems from the movement of the nominal
exchange rate. The appreciation reduces the amount of real balances available to households,
which in turn requires a fall in consumption.
The indirect eﬀects on the consumption responses hinges both on the degree of pricing to
market and on the home bias in consumption. It can be shown that a higher degree of PTM
always reduces domestic consumption and raises foreign consumption. This is due to the fact
that the limited pass-through eﬀect associated with PTM dominates the ampliﬁed appreciation
of the exchange rate. The PTM reasoning also applies for the home bias eﬀect.
For the above reasons world demand and consequently world production are not aﬀected by
a domestic ﬁscal expansion in the short run. As for the respective individual output responses,
domestic employment is determined by the condition ht = (1 ¡ s)ya
t (h) + s(ym
t (h) + ym¤
t (h)),
and foreign employment analogously by h¤
t = (1 ¡ s)ya
t (f) + s(ym¤
t (f) + ym
t (f)). Linearizing
these conditions and substituting for the respective demands via the linearized goods market
equilibria we get




+ (1 ¡ s)(1 ¡ !)2!µ ˜ et (39)
and
˜ h¤
t = ! ˜ c¤
t + (1 ¡ !)˜ ct + (1 ¡ !)
dgt
¯ c
¡ (1 ¡ s)(1 ¡ !)2!µ ˜ et (40)
22Furthermore, substituting for the individual consumption variables ˜ ct and ˜ c¤
t we arrive at:
˜ ht = (1 ¡ s)(1 ¡ !)(2!(µ ¡ 1) + 1) ˜ et (41)
and
˜ h¤
t = ¡(1 ¡ s)(1 ¡ !)(2!(µ ¡ 1) + 1) ˜ et
In the short run, hours worked only depend on the movement of the exchange rate which
determines the competitiveness of the respective goods. An appreciation of the exchange rate
lowers demand for home goods as the relative price tends to rise. Home consumers face cheaper
imports whereas home exports become less attractive for foreign consumers. The opposite is
true for foreign goods, hence the reduction (rise) of home (foreign) production and hours
worked. Again, an increasing fraction s of PTM goods and a stronger home bias limit the
expenditure switching eﬀect as a greater share of good prices are not subject to exchange rate
movements.
Solving the exchange rate equation (36) for the trade balance response yields:
¯dft+1
¯ p¯ c
= (1 ¡ !)
µ






As can be seen from (42), the appreciation of the exchange rate and a positive domestic ﬁscal
expansion work in the same direction, whereas a negative consumption diﬀerential mitigates the
deterioration of the trade balance. Replacing the short run consumption diﬀerential deﬁned




= (1 ¡ !)[(1 ¡ s)2!(µ ¡ 1) + 1] ˜ et
Thus, altogether a permanent government expenditure shock causes a deterioration of the trade
balance via the exchange rate appreciation. With output temporarily falling due to a decline in
competitiveness, and the sum of private and government consumption demand rising, domestic
households resort to selling bonds so as to ﬁnance the gap between net short run income and
consumption expenditures. A higher degree of PTM or of the home bias dampen this eﬀect.
234 WELFARE ANALYSIS
So far, we have established the eﬀects of an unanticipated permanent ﬁscal shock on the short
run variables of interest. Remember the main short run results: The driving force of the model
is the exchange rate which appreciates. Domestic consumption decreases, but by less than
the increased tax burden, while foreign consumption decreases by the domestic re-increase.
Domestic households work less whereas foreign households work more in spite of the demand
composition eﬀects. Totaling these eﬀects, the home country runs a current account deﬁcit.
In this section we analyze the welfare implications of this adjustment process. With the
microfoundations of our model at hand, we do not have to rely any longer on ad hoc welfare
criteria as for example output stimulation per se. However, due to suboptimally low steady
state production levels, ﬁscal policy may improve welfare when production is stimulated and
the net present value of production in consumption units exceeds the accompanying loss of
utility stemming from a higher working eﬀort. We identify three welfare driving eﬀects which
depend both on the degree of PTM and on the home bias in consumption: an overall demand
eﬀect, a terms-of-trade eﬀect, and an expenditure switching eﬀect.
To the end of a thorough short, long run and overall welfare quantiﬁcation we totally
diﬀerentiate the utility function (1):




Short run domestic utility depends positively on consumption of the households, and negatively













The ﬁscal expansion reduces domestic welfare via the amount of taxes paid. On the other
hand, the appreciation of the exchange rate has an unambiguously positive eﬀect on welfare
as it leads to the aforementioned re-increase in consumption and a reduction of hours worked.
With total PTM or ! ! 1, there is no mitigating eﬀect of the exchange rate at all.
We may carry out the same exercise for the foreign country. Then, the change of foreign
24utility in the short run is given by
dU¤









Comparing (43) and (44) reveals that the home country - while still suﬀering the tax induced
welfare loss - may raise short run utility at the expense of the foreign country. Adding up the
individual changes in welfare we deduce that the total eﬀect on world welfare is ¡
dgt
¯ c . The
interesting aspect of the short run model lies in the international distribution of the welfare
loss that is associated with a tax-ﬁnanced domestic ﬁscal expansion.
Obviously, while welfare enhancing in the short run, the current account deﬁcit of the home
country has negative welfare implications in the long run via permanent interest rate payments.
Additionally, a permanent ﬁscal expansion raises long run overall demand and aﬀects the long
run terms of trade. In order to assess the overall welfare impact, we have to calculate welfare
eﬀects for subsequent periods t + i with i = 1;2;:::;1. From the long run home and foreign






















In the subsequent periods, world consumption of the private sector will be reduced while
world output is stimulated. As both eﬀects are welfare reducing, world utility will decrease in
the long run. Calculating the long run consumption diﬀerential and the diﬀerential of hours
worked, and combining these results with the respective world responses, we arrive at the
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25As can easily be seen, the permanent ﬁscal expansion lowers domestic welfare from period
t + 1 on, and increases foreign welfare. Domestic households consume less and work more in
the long run than in the initial steady state in order to ﬁnance government expenditure and to
meet the permanent interest payments on debt accumulated in the short run. In the foreign
country, the situation is the other way around: Employment decreases, while consumption
increases. All in all, the foreign households are better oﬀ in the long run.
To obtain the full impact of the ﬁscal shock we now combine the short and long term utility
eﬀects. Using dVt = dUt + (1=r)dUt+1 and the analogous expression for the foreign country,
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´
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For the range of parameter values we consider, the term preceding the exchange rate varia-
tion is always positive. The overall welfare eﬀects of the ﬁscal expansion are thus unambiguous:
Households in the home country suﬀer a welfare loss, whereas the foreign households’ welfare
improves. A ﬁscal expansion becomes a “prosper-thy-neighbor”instrument in our model. Fig-
ure 2 illustrates the welfare eﬀects of a one percent increase of domestic government expenditure
dgp
¯ c depending on ! for diﬀerent values of s. For the numerical simulation we picked the pa-
rameter values stated above. A permanent ﬁscal expansion always lowers domestic welfare as
the domestic households have to ﬁnance the overall expansion of demand while the welfare
eﬀects stemming from the international transmission of the ﬁscal shock are second order. The
evolution of foreign welfare (Figure 2(b)) gives a clearer picture of the underlying adjustment
process because foreign government expenditures are unchanged and do not blur the analysis.
It is helpful to distinguish between the anticipated and the unanticipated component of the
permanent ﬁscal shock. The dominating eﬀect on foreign overall welfare is the anticipated
stimulation of world demand in the long run (Overall Demand Eﬀect), which explains the
rough picture given in Figure 2(b). Increased world demand translates either in higher foreign
production or higher relative foreign producer prices both of which are welfare enhancing. A
26stronger home bias in consumption reduces the positive impact of overall demand on foreign
welfare as world demand falls primarily on domestic goods.21
Figure 2(b) also shows the eﬀects of diﬀerent levels of s on foreign welfare.22 A higher
share of PTM goods leads to higher foreign overall welfare levels. This eﬀect is associated with
the unanticipated component of the ﬁscal expansion. Against the backdrop of rigid prices,
the share of PTM producers determines the direction of the short run terms of trade response
(Terms of Trade Eﬀect) and governs the international structure of production via its impact
on the degree of expenditure switching (Expenditure Switching Eﬀect).
To begin with, we derive the welfare eﬀects which stem from a change of the short run
terms of trade. Linearizing equation (15) yields:
˜ ¿t = (2s ¡ 1) ˜ et
Both pricing-to-market and a home bias in consumption aﬀect the terms of trade via their
impact on the exchange rate. However, the direction of the terms of trade response exclusively
depends on the degree of PTM. From a foreign perspective the short run exchange rate depre-
ciates. Then, the foreign terms of trade improve as long as more than half of the goods are
priced to market. With s = 0:5 the terms of trade remain unaﬀected, while s < 0:5 yields a
worsening. Thus, when purchasing power parity holds, i.e. s = 0, the foreign terms of trade
deteriorate following an unanticipated permanent ﬁscal shock.23 Therefore, a higher degree of
PTM has a positive impact on overall foreign welfare via the terms of trade. When assessing
the quantitative relevance of the terms of trade eﬀect one has to take into account the impli-
cations of a possible home bias in consumption. A higher home bias implies less integration
of goods markets, i.e. the importance of relative price changes in international trade declines.
On account of this, a home bias in consumption mitigates the respective terms of trade eﬀects.
The second major short run channel of transmission is the expenditure switching eﬀect
associated with the appreciation of the exchange rate. The international structure of produc-
tion hinges primarily on relative prices.24 As the relative price of foreign goods falls, foreign
21Remember that the composition of world demand is biased towards the domestic country.
22The reasoning also applies for domestic welfare, but with the opposite eﬀect, see Figure 2(a).
23The implications of PTM for the foreign terms of trade stated in Betts and Devereux (2000) are reversed,
because, in their model, the equilibrium exchange rate appreciates from a foreign point of view.
24As long as there is a home bias in consumption, the structure of short run production also displays a
demand composition eﬀect. However, the expenditure switching eﬀect always dominates the latter. See Pitterle
27production is stimulated while domestic production is shortened. Abstracting from terms of
trade changes, expenditure switching has a positive eﬀect on foreign welfare. As for the pricing
behavior of producers, PTM limits the expenditure switching eﬀect and reduces foreign wel-
fare because less goods are subject to price changes originating in exchange rate movements.
If s = 1, there are no changes in short run relative prices at all and foreign and domestic pro-
duction remain unchanged. From the short run output equations (39) and (40) it follows that
a stronger home bias in consumption also reduces the expenditure switching eﬀect because of
the diminished importance of imports in the consumption index.
Hence, pricing to market has opposing eﬀects on the terms of trade and expenditure switch-
ing. For s = 1, there is a strong positive terms of trade eﬀect and no expenditure switching.
Moving towards s = 0, the terms of trade continuously deteriorate while expenditure switch-
ing towards foreign production becomes more and more pronounced. All in all, the adverse
evolution of the terms of trade dominates the positive expenditure switching eﬀect.
The opposing terms of trade and expenditure switching eﬀects become most evident when
the overall demand eﬀect is absent. Therefore, we extend our analysis to a temporary ﬁscal
expansion. Figures 2(c) and 2(d) depict the overall welfare eﬀects for both countries. The
prosper-thy-neighbor property of domestic ﬁscal expansions is strongest when all producers
pursue pricing to market and consumption is not biased. In this case, the only welfare relevant
eﬀect stems from an improvement of the short run foreign terms of trade. For s = 0:5, the terms
of trade eﬀect is zero while expenditure switching has a positive impact on foreign production
and welfare. If s = 0, expenditure switching is maximal, whereas the foreign terms of trade
are at its worst level.
In the case of s = 1 and s = 0:5, a higher home bias in consumption lowers foreign overall
welfare as the respective positive eﬀects are dampened. If purchasing power parity holds, the
welfare eﬀect of the home bias in consumption is ambiguous. Initially, a higher ! increases
foreign welfare because the mitigation of the negative terms of trade eﬀect dominates the
weakening of the positive expenditure switching eﬀect. For high levels of !, however, the
situation is the other way around and an increasing home bias lowers foreign welfare.
All in all, we can conclude that the magnitude of the prosper-thy-neighbor eﬀect depends
on the interplay of pricing to market and the home bias in consumption. A greater share of
and Steﬀen (2004) for the monetary union case, where the demand composition eﬀect is the major welfare
driving force.
28PTM goods tends to reinforce the prosper-thy-neighbor eﬀect while a stronger home bias in
consumption reduces the positive spillover of expansive domestic ﬁscal policy.
5 CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper has analyzed the eﬀects of ﬁscal shocks in a two-country general equilibrium model
with sticky prices. We have established that introducing money via a cash-in-advance con-
straint, where households need cash both to purchase consumption goods and to pay taxes,
has important implications for the exchange rate movement and for the associated welfare
eﬀects. In contrast to standard NOEM models with money in the utility, our model yields an
appreciation of the exchange rate following an unanticipated domestic ﬁscal expansion. Via
the implied expenditure switching domestic production declines in the short run and the dete-
rioration of the current account is exacerbated. Aggregating short and long run welfare for the
foreign households reveals that a domestic ﬁscal expansion acts as a “prosper-thy-neighbor”
instrument. In addition, we have derived the eﬀects of market segmentation and asymmetric
preferences which both amplify the movement of the exchange rate. As for the welfare impli-
cations of a domestic ﬁscal expansion we identiﬁed three major transmission mechanisms: the
expansion of world demand, the change of the terms of trade and expenditure switching. A
detailed analysis of the competing eﬀects has demonstrated that a higher share of PTM goods
reinforces the prosper-thy-neighbor eﬀect while a home bias in consumption tends to reduce
the positive spillover eﬀects.
Our contribution sheds light on the sensitivity of NOEM models to the speciﬁcation of
money demand. Future theoretical research may focus on more explicit comparisons of the
competing approaches to model money demand. Furthermore, empirical research has to provide
guidance for the right policy implications by supplying evidence on both the exchange rate
eﬀects of ﬁscal policy and the determinants of money demand.
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(d) foreign, temporary shock
30A Derivation of the Long Run Consumption Diﬀerential
We begin with the log-linearization of the long run current accounts (18) and (19), the inter-
national diﬀerence of which is given by









+ 2(1 ¡ !)(˜ ph
t+1 ¡ ˜ p
f
t+1)
Here, we made use of the very simple long run Euler equations (22) and (23) which reduce to
Rt+1 = ¯. This is due to the fact that the new steady state is reached in t + 1. Hence, the
long run deviation of the bond price is zero. Additionally, keep in mind that bond holdings
that have been accumulated in the short run represent the new steady state stock, that is
dft+1 = dft+2. Besides, df = ¡df¤ must hold in every period to assure bond market clearing.
From the deﬁnition of the long run price levels stated in Table 1 we get the price relation




t+1) = 2(!¡1)(˜ ph
t+1¡ ˜ p
f
t+1) which we use so as to match the endogenous
price diﬀerentials that show up in the further equations. Taking diﬀerences of the linearized
goods markets (20) and (21) we arrive at
(˜ yt+1¡˜ y¤









Finally, the diﬀerence of the linearized labor markets (24) and (25) may be stated as
µ ¡ 1
µ
(˜ yt+1 ¡ ˜ y¤
t+1) = ¡(˜ ct+1 ¡ ˜ c¤
t+1) + 2(1 ¡ !)(˜ ph
t+1 ¡ ˜ p
f
t+1) (A-2)
where we made use of the fact that ˜ yt+1¡˜ y¤
t+1 = ˜ ht+1¡˜ h¤
t+1. All in all, we get three equations in
the four endogenous terms (˜ ct+1¡˜ c¤
t+1),
2(1¡¯)dft+1
¯ p¯ c , (˜ yt+1¡˜ y¤




of the output and price diﬀerential yields the long run consumption diﬀerential (28) that only
depends on the exogenous long term government expenditure diﬀerential, and on bond holdings
that are determined in the short run. In the presence of temporary shocks, it is only bond
holdings that determine the consumption diﬀerential in the long run.
31B Linearized Short Run Equilibrium
The log-linear version of the short run equilibrium simpliﬁes substantially as individual prices
are ﬁxed and drop out of the system of equations.
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˜ ct+1 = ˜ pt ¡ ˜ pt+1 + ˜ ct ¡ ˜ Rt (B-1)
˜ c¤
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t ¡ ˜ Rt + ˜ et ¡ ˜ et+1 (B-2)
In the sequel, we present the derivation of the short run exchange rate (37) in detail. We






(˜ ct+1 ¡ ˜ c¤
t+1) +
(2!µ2 ¡ 6!µ + 3µ + 2! ¡ 1)






In order to eliminate the long run consumption diﬀerential from this equation, we calculate
32the diﬀerence of the linearized Euler equations (B-1) and (B-2):
˜ ct+1 ¡ ˜ c¤
t+1 = ˜ ct ¡ ˜ c¤
t + ˜ pt ¡ ˜ p¤
t ¡ ˜ pt+1 + ˜ p¤
t+1 ¡ ˜ et + ˜ et+1
Using the linearized price levels (26), (33), (34) and the long run labor market diﬀerence (A-2)
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Combining linearized versions of the long run goods and labor market diﬀerences (A-1) and
(A-2), we arrive at the long run diﬀerential of hours worked:
(˜ ht+1 ¡ ˜ h¤
t+1) = ¡(˜ ct+1 ¡ ˜ c¤
t+1) +
2! ¡ 1





A negative consumption diﬀerential increases the domestic relative work eﬀort. This eﬀect
stems from the standard labor leisure trade-oﬀ, compare equation (13). With a home bias
in consumption, a positive government expenditure diﬀerential works in the same direction.
Plugging (B-5) into (B-4), we get the following relationship between short-run and long-run
consumption:
(˜ ct+1 ¡ ˜ c¤
t+1) =
2(1 ¡ !)µ
2µ + 2! ¡ 2!µ ¡ 1
(˜ ct ¡ ˜ c¤
t) +
2(1 ¡ !)µ(2!s ¡ 2! ¡ 2s + 1)
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(1 ¡ ¯)(2µ + 2! ¡ 2!µ ¡ 1)
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+
(2µ ¡ 1)(2! ¡ 1)2(µ ¡ 1) + (2!µ2 ¡ 6!µ + 2! + 3µ ¡ 1)(2!µ ¡ 2µ ¡ 2! + 1)






Then, substituting for the international bond holdings in (36) and combining it with exchange
rate equation (35) so as to eliminate the short run consumption diﬀerential, gives us the short
run response of the exchange rate to an unanticipated ﬁscal shock. The ﬁnal exchange rate
equation (37) describes the impact of a permanent shock, that is for dgt+1 = dgt = dgp.
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